The Role of Corporate Governance in Financial Fraud Prevention: A Systematic Literature Review
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This study systematically examines corporate governance mechanisms and their effectiveness in preventing financial fraud across diverse organizational contexts. The findings reveal that governance effectiveness is highly context-dependent, influenced by industry type, firm size, and regulatory environment. Tailored governance strategies incorporating structural oversight and cultural dimensions significantly reduce fraud risk. Moreover, regulatory frameworks and enforcement practices must strike a balance to maintain managerial motivation while ensuring accountability. Emerging governance challenges such as digitalization, board political connections, and stakeholder inclusivity require further empirical investigation. The study contributes to the literature by advocating integrated governance frameworks that combine formal and informal elements, offering insights for researchers and practitioners seeking to enhance fraud mitigation. These findings are important for developing adaptive, context-sensitive governance models that effectively address contemporary fraud risks.
Keywords: Audit Committees, Board Composition, Corporate Governance, Financial Fraud Prevention, Fraud Mitigation Strategies
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini secara sistematis mengkaji mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan dan efektivitasnya dalam mencegah penipuan keuangan di berbagai konteks organisasi. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa efektivitas tata kelola sangat dipengaruhi oleh konteks, termasuk jenis industri, ukuran perusahaan, dan lingkungan regulasi. Strategi tata kelola yang disesuaikan dengan mengintegrasikan pengawasan struktural dan dimensi budaya secara signifikan mengurangi risiko penipuan. Selain itu, kerangka regulasi dan praktik penegakan harus menyeimbangkan motivasi manajerial dan akuntabilitas. Tantangan tata kelola baru seperti digitalisasi, koneksi politik dewan, dan inklusivitas pemangku kepentingan membutuhkan penelitian empiris lebih lanjut. Studi ini memberikan kontribusi dengan mendorong kerangka tata kelola terpadu yang menggabungkan elemen formal dan informal serta memberikan wawasan bagi peneliti dan praktisi untuk meningkatkan mitigasi penipuan. Temuan ini memiliki implikasi penting dalam pengembangan model tata kelola yang adaptif dan sensitif konteks untuk mengatasi risiko penipuan kontemporer.
Kata Kunci: Komite Audit, Komposisi Dewan, Tata Kelola Perusahaan, Pencegahan Penipuan Keuangan, Strategi Mitigasi Penipuan
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