Performance Legitimacy: The Socio-Economic Conditions Under The Sultan’s Administration In Yogyakarta

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ABSTRACT

The paper examined the Sultan’s performance as a political leader to determine whether the Yogyakarta people had any apparent reasons to be dissatisfied with the Sultan as governor after 1998. This paper originates from a case study that works with primary data and secondary literature. The primary data was collected through participant-observation and semi-structured interviews with a large number of informants of Yogyakarta’s local politics. The data acquired from fieldwork was analyzed qualitatively based on coding and thematic similarities. In his capacity as governor, Hamengkubuwono has succeeded in coordinating the provincial, municipal, and district governments in Yogyakarta. Even though outcomes in some policy areas remain underwhelming, for example, in the areas of poverty alleviation and inequality, public attention to these issues has been limited. Consequently, Yogyakarta’s decent socio-economic development is an indication that the province’s unique governmental arrangement with an unelected governor has worked well.

Keyword:
Performance, Legitimacy, Socio-Economic Condition, Sultan, Yogyakarta

INTRODUCTION

This paper assessed the sultan’s performance as a political leader to determine whether the people in Yogyakarta had any apparent reasons to be dissatisfied with the Sultan as governor after 1998. The achievements and shortcomings of developments in his administration provide an overview of Yogyakarta’s political and socio-economic conditions since the beginning of democratization. Utilizing extensive data from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS), The study will demonstrate that Yogyakarta has a relatively strong track record in many socio-economic indicators. This excellent

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performance provides Sultan Hamengkubuwono X with an additional pillar of legitimacy, even though technically he only has a coordinating role to play vis-à-vis the Yogyakarta city mayor and the district heads within his province.

The paper works with the Historical institutionalism as the theoretical framework. It posits that people’s political behavior is determined not only by cultural reasons but also by rational calculations (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 939). This situation applies to the people of Yogyakarta who support their cultural ruler to govern the region, not only based on his cultural prestige but also because, as this study will show, the Sultan’s leadership has proven successful in maintaining stability in local politics of Yogyakarta. This condition, in turn, has facilitated the positive development of socio-economic conditions (ibid, p. 942). A stable political situation like this can become a leverage factor to business investment and attract more investors to come. Economic growth and living standards in Yogyakarta have improved under the Sultan’s leadership (interview with Robby Kusumaharta, 24 February 2016). Given this situation, people have another reason not to oppose the Sultan as their governor despite his missing electoral mandate. This study will elaborate on these arguments by looking closely at a range of socio-economic development indicators. Thus, the paper provides a picture of the Yogyakarta Special Region under the Sultan’s administration.

The study analyses Yogyakarta’s development by looking at performance indicators such as the Human Development Index, employment rates, local economic growth, crime figures, and corruption cases investigated by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). It begins with an analysis of data provided by government reports covering developments in the HDI and the Indonesian government’s better governance principles. These account for the capacity of regional governments to administer the region efficiently based on universal management principles aimed to enhance public service delivery. The paper focuses on regional economic growth in Yogyakarta, before switching attention to socio-political factors such as unemployment, criminality, and corruption. As will be seen, the post-1998 period in Yogyakarta characterized by political stability and substantial economic growth. While the region also experienced some adverse developments, these had a negligible impact on the sultan’s claims to legitimacy.

METHOD

This paper originates from a case study that works with primary data and secondary literature—the primary data collected during two extended fieldwork trips in Yogyakarta. On location, the author applied qualitative research methods such as participant-observation and semi-structured interviews with a large number of informants who are familiar with the local politics of Yogyakarta. The semi-structured interviews, meanwhile, were the primary method of collecting data about the situation in Yogyakarta.

The interview participants were familiar with the exceptional government system of Yogyakarta and the daily politics in the region. The interviewees included members of the provincial and some local parliaments, academics, provincial and local government officers, as well as NGO and civil society activists. Thus, while snowballing was sometimes used, the primary method of determining participants in Yogyakarta was purposive sampling, which selects the informants based on the
purpose of the research. This method helped the author to collect data from a broad range of eligible informants.

Primary data acquired from fieldwork interpreted qualitatively based on coding and thematic similarities. During the data analysis process, the author triangulated the sources of evidence to build authoritative information gathered from the interviews, observation notes, and news coverage. While primary data constituted the bulk of the material used for the empirical evidence of this study, secondary sources consulted to add depth to the analysis and develop the conceptual framework. Most secondary sources taken from academic literature, archival materials, government documents, think tank publications, local and national media reports, and other material related to political developments in Yogyakarta.

RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS:
This section will discuss the achievements and shortcomings of developments Yogyakarta that comprise socio-economic and political indicators.

The Human Development Index of Yogyakarta
In 2013, Yogyakarta climbed up to the second spot in the provincial HDI rankings in Indonesia, reaching a score of 77.37. Yogyakarta’s HDI score was significantly higher than the national average and lowered only because of the national capital Jakarta which reached 78.59. Based on the BPS report clearly, Yogyakarta’s human development during the era of democratization has been consistently one of the best in the country; between 1999 and 2015, the index increased from 68.7 to 77.59. In Indonesia, a high HDI is not merely a recognition of high standards in education, health, and economic wellbeing. It also has repercussions for center-periphery relations as the central government uses the HDI index as one of several indicators when considering the amounts of General Allocation Grants (Dana Alokasi Umum/DAU), it provides to the regions to finance their development.

Health Indicators, Schooling, and Education
Yogyakarta has recorded particularly good scores for the life expectancy of its residents. The HDI’s life expectancy at birth category estimates the average number of years from birth to achieve by an individual cohort based on a set of age-specific mortality rates (BPS, 2016). Based on this method, Yogyakarta has the highest life expectancy of any Indonesian province, even higher than Jakarta. This condition is particularly striking because Yogyakarta does not have a particularly high health budget. In fact, in 2012, Yogyakarta allocated the smallest annual budget for all Indonesian provinces. With health expenditure measuring just 3.36 percent of the yearly budget (Muryanto, 2013), the Yogyakarta government spent only IDR 5,807 per individual on health services.

The small numbers reflect the broader reality of the politics of health policymaking in Indonesia, where many health services delegated to the district and city governments rather than the provincial governments (Fossati, 2016). Among other essential services, district governments subsidize public health institutions. Such as community clinics and public hospitals as well as the local health insurance scheme (Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah/JAMKESDA), which features free and low contribution provisions, particularly for low-income households in their areas. Like elsewhere in Indonesia, cheap or free healthcare has become a
prevalent campaign issue that helps candidates attract voters (Aspinall, 2014). Health policy, in short, is mostly a matter for other layers of government rather than the provincial government, so Yogyakarta’s good results in this dimension of the HDI can hardly be attributed directly to the sultan’s policies. However, as Fossati (2016) has shown, health insurance coverage in Indonesia’s regions is generally better if district governments cooperate closely with provincial governments. Since the relations between Hamengkubuwono and the various district heads and Yogyakarta’s mayor have been generally good, the sultan can, arguably, take at least some credit for the excellent health indicators in Yogyakarta.

Despite the higher HDI index, Yogyakarta is also well-known in Indonesia as a center for learning. While this reputation primarily linked to the presence of tertiary education institutions such as the prestigious Gadjah Mada University (BPS, 2015). The city also has a dense network of pre-schools, primary schools, and high schools, which reflected in top enrolment statistics. Between 2003 and 2015, Yogyakarta topped the national enrolment statistics in all of these three categories. As a result of the proper primary and secondary education opportunities, children in Yogyakarta also have a very high literacy rate of 93.47 percent, which corresponds to the second rank nationwide after Aceh (97.63 percent). These national figures echoed in Yogyakarta’s rankings in the provincial Human Development Index, which measures indicators such as the expected years of schooling (Harapan Lama Sekolah/HLS) and the mean years of schooling (Rata-rata Lama Sekolah/RLS). In 2015, Yogyakarta gained a score of 15.03 for the HLS, which means that children under seven years old have an excellent chance of finishing their education to the level of senior high school or even a one-year diploma. Despite the top of the HLS rankings, the RLS rankings do not perform equally well and similar to other provinces.

Yogyakarta’s reputation underpinned by a strong performance in the HDI’s education benchmarks. However, as with the health indicators, education is mainly outside the provincial government’s responsibilities. Yogyakarta’s provincial government with the sultan has had relatively little influence over education policy in Yogyakarta. It can, therefore, claim no direct credit for the city’s above-average HDI scores in this dimension as the responsibilities mostly belong to the district and local governments. That said, public perception is shaped to a large extent by the reputation of Yogyakarta as a city of learning, and the sultan no doubt benefits from that reputation.

Income Levels, Standard of Living, and Economic Growth

The last dimension of the HDI measures income levels and standard of living based on purchasing power parity (PPP). In this category, Jakarta, as the capital city and center of commerce and trade tops the ranking, followed by the Riau Islands, an exclusive economic zone bordering Singapore and Malaysia, and Indonesia’s leading tourism hub, Bali. Yogyakarta follows in the fourth spot with a purchasing power parity of IDR 12,684 in 2015. It has been sustained by solid if unspectacular economic growth in Yogyakarta over the years. Between 2001 and 2014, Yogyakarta’s economic growth fluctuated between 3.7 percent in 2006 and a high point of 5.49 in 2013. These growth rates put it in the bottom half of provincial growth rates, but in fact, most of the provinces with a high overall HDI score
fared comparatively poorly in terms of economic growth. Between 2005 and 2014, Yogyakarta’s growth rates were always lower than the national growth rate.

The main drivers of the Yogyakarta economy are trade and tourism, with attractions like the Borobudur and Prambanan temples or Mt. Merapi within easy reach of the city. In 2016, the tourism sector contributed 35 percent of Yogyakarta’s provincial gross domestic product (Tempo, 2015). Significantly, the sultan himself has a direct stake in the tourism industry as the Kraton is also one of the most popular destinations for tourists visiting the city. Here, Yogyakarta benefits from the Java-centric tourism policies of the New Order (Dahles, 2001). Indeed, the Yogyakarta municipality’s trade and hospitality sectors have been among the fastest-growing of any local government in Indonesia and certainly within the provincial boundaries of the Yogyakarta Special Region. The massive growth of these sectors in the city of Yogyakarta has resulted in very high purchasing power parity scores over the years, reaching IDR 17,317 in 2015 (BPS, 2017). Other districts within the province have recorded much lower figures, with Sleman reaching IDR 14,562, Bantul IDR 14,320, Kulon Progo IDR 8,688, and Gunung Kidul IDR 8,336.

Local governments may have the authority to issue permits and licenses, but they still need access to land to implement their visions for local development. That is where the sultan and Pakualam come in on the fray. As the owners of vast tracts of land, they hold the key to making the construction of new infrastructure projects in Yogyakarta possible. Hamengkubuwono and Pakualam, as the owners of the Sultan and Pakualam grounds, have often provided their land for such projects (interview with Nur Ahmad Affandi, 1 September 2016). Examples include the development of the airport and seaport as well as tourism destinations on the south coast of Yogyakarta in the Kulon Progo, Bantul, and Gunung Kidul districts.

However, this growth has not been felt equally across Yogyakarta’s population. Inequality has been on the rise across Indonesia (World Bank, 2015), and Yogyakarta is no exception.

**Figure 1. Low Income Household in City and Districts of Yogyakarta Special Region**

![Graph showing income distribution](image)

*Source: BPS*

The Statistics Bureau measures income distribution among people using the Gini index and discrepancies between districts through the Williamson index. For both of them, a higher score means a broader gap between measured entities. Thus, the higher the Gini coefficient, the more significant the income gap, and the larger the Williamson index, the more significant the gap between local administrative entities within the Yogyakarta province.

**Inequality and Poverty Alleviation in Yogyakarta**

Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau from 1996 to 2015, Yogyakarta has had high Gini indexes for most of the last twenty years. In fact, in some years, it recorded the most top inequality figures in the whole of Indonesia. In 2015,
Yogyakarta's index was 0.43, and together with Jakarta, it had the highest coefficient of the ten provinces with the highest HDI in Indonesia.

The numbers illustrate that while economic development in Yogyakarta has been steady, this development has not resulted in equal wealth distribution. BPS reports suggest that the gap is particularly high in urban areas (0.443), whereas rural regions recorded a slightly lower score of 0.332. The results shed light on the uneven socio-economic impacts of Yogyakarta’s development strategy focused on trade and hospitality, which mainly concentrated in the urban areas around Yogyakarta city and Sleman district. And while growing inequality is a nationwide trend, the provincial government has acknowledged that the numbers in Yogyakarta are cause for concern. In the governor’s 2015 accountability report, he finally pledged to take measures to lower the coefficient (BPS, 2015).

In other words, high inequality means that substantial parts of the population in Yogyakarta are still poor. Indeed, statistics on poverty in Yogyakarta make for sobering reading. In 2015, Yogyakarta ranked twelfth in the statistics that record the highest number of poor people in Indonesian provinces. It was the highest-ranked province in Java, which generally regarded as the most developed island in Indonesia. Yogyakarta had the highest percentage of poor people, with 13.25 percent higher than the national figure of 11 percent.

The distribution of poverty mirrors the findings from the previous statistics. Low-income families mostly come from rural areas and work in the agricultural sector. Accordingly, they mainly concentrated in the districts of Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul (see Figure 1), where neither are mining nor manufacturing industries, not to mention tourism sites. As employment opportunities in these areas are scarce, economic conditions have improved little over the last decades (Maharani, 2016). Thus, even though the percentage of poor people has been decreasing, it is still a high number compared to other provinces in Java.

The national, regional, and local governments have attempted to decrease the poverty in Yogyakarta by organizing poverty reduction programs. They have launched various programs, ranging from a village-based poverty alleviation program in 1997 to a new poverty alleviation program in 2013. Based on a survey conducted by the Kemitraan project in 2013, Yogyakarta’s provincial government allocated IDR 100,147 per capita for poverty reduction. One of the governor’s initiatives is the community-based program called Segoro Amarto (Sidik, 2010), or, the spirit of cooperation to develop a progressive Yogyakarta (Semangat gotong royong agawe majune Ngayogyakarta). It promotes cultural values to poor people and seeks to involve them more directly in alleviating poverty. Allowing people to participate vigorously in administering the activities provides new work opportunities to them. Ultimately, however, people will need to find a longer-term work if they are to lift out of poverty.

**The Employment Sector in Yogyakarta**

In 2015, a total of 2.1 million people in Yogyakarta employed, comprising 1.68 percent of the national workforce in Indonesia (BPS, 2016). The unemployment rate in Yogyakarta was 4.07 percent, which was below the national rate of 5.99 percent. Compared to other provinces, unemployment in Yogyakarta was the
tenth-lowest out of 34 areas in Indonesia. Interestingly, among the ten regions with the lowest unemployment rate, only Bali and Yogyakarta have a high HDI index, whereas the rest are provinces with a lower HDI index. Among the ten best HDI provinces, Yogyakarta has the second-lowest unemployment rate after Bali, which in fact, had the lowest unemployment rate of all Indonesian areas.

Unsurprisingly, in Yogyakarta, most people work in the trade and tourism sector, which makes up 26.6 percent of the workforce. Agriculture, however, is still the second largest sector with 22.81 percent and the most popular occupation in the rural areas of the Yogyakarta special region, although even here, the number of people contributing to agriculture keeps decreasing. Workforce participation in rural areas is generally higher than in urban areas, reaching 81.09 percent compared to just 68.55 percent in urban areas. However, it is noteworthy that rural areas have a very high disguised unemployment rate of 35.34 because people in these areas tend to work fewer than 35 hours a week. In urban areas, by contrast, the hidden unemployment rate is only 18.79 percent.

For the provincial government, economic development is focused clearly on trade and tourism. For years, it has been working with city and district governments to try and ease investment regulations for those sectors to open new job opportunities for the Yogyakarta workforce (interview with Nur Ahmad Affandi, 1 September 2016). For example, the sultan issued a regulation about investment and cooperation at the regional level, which set guidelines for all local governments in the province to plan, promote, and facilitate Yogyakarta’s development. This policy has been successful insofar as it has gradually increased the number of people who work in the trade and tourism sectors. The success confirms Fossati’s (2016) findings of the health sector that local policy outcomes tend to be dependent on effective and efficient collaboration between district and provincial governments.

As trade and tourism form the main focus of the government’s economic policy, other sectors tend to receive less favorable treatment from the government. In Kulon Progo, for example, people had turned previously unproductive, sandy land into fertile soil, which supported their livelihoods for decades, providing work for young farmers around the place and effectively reducing the disguised unemployment in the local farming sector (NA, 2013). The area attracted large numbers of local people into new forms of agriculture. These successful local initiatives eventually clashed with the government-supported mega-developments of a new seaport and airport in Kulon Progo. To implement these developments, the government sought to relocate many farms. Thus, investments in trade and tourism promoted at the cost of removing successful agricultural initiatives. The government has defended these policies by pointing out that those jobs offer better salaries and regular income. Significantly, however, incomes in Yogyakarta, especially at the lower end of the wage spectrum, are comparatively low, as the next section will show.

**Regional Minimum Wage**

Among the ten best HDI provinces in Indonesia, the Yogyakarta provincial government has applied the lowest minimum wage for workers since 1997. As of 2016, a worker earned a minimum of IDR 1.238 million per month, which was well below the national average salary of IDR
1.999 million. In Jakarta, a worker made more than double as the minimum wage; there was IDR 3.1 million. Yogyakarta’s provincial government argued that the minimum wage is aware of the amount required for a decent living in the province and the need to keep inflation in check (interview with Tavip Agus Rayanto, 17 February 2016). Concerning that goal, it has been reasonably successful, as Yogyakarta’s inflation has indeed been lower than that of many other areas of comparable size. While the provincial minimum wage is already low, it is noteworthy that many workers in the agricultural sector earn even less than the minimum wage. In 2015, an agrarian worker earned only IDR 0.788 million as a monthly income. This amount is less than half of the average monthly income of people working in the service sector who earned an average of IDR 1.892 million per month in 2015.

To determine the provincial minimum wage, the Yogyakarta government applies the lowest district level minimum wage. Between 2012 and 2016, this found in Gunung Kidul district, which set the lowest salary of all municipalities and districts in Yogyakarta (see Figure 2). Thus, the provincial government of Yogyakarta used it as the threshold for the whole province. Like other provinces in Indonesia, labor unions in Yogyakarta have repeatedly demanded higher wages related to the territorial limit. They argue that despite the relatively low cost of living in Yogyakarta, the payments are too small to cover their monthly expenses.

Furthermore, they suggested the provincial government used sector-based wages to provide fairer income opportunities for workers. Another frequently articulated demand has been to involve labor unions directly in drafting the minimum wage regulations (Rabbani, 2016). So far, however, the provincial government has resisted these calls for a more inclusive approach to the minimum wage setting.

As a consequence of the persistent wage disparity and the government’s economic focus on the trade and tourism sectors. Many people are looking for better-paid work in the city of Yogyakarta, causing increasing (though not always voluntary, see Gunung Kidul) labor migration from rural to urban areas. Every day they commute from their homes in the outer suburbs and adjacent rural areas to the city to look for work. However, for many people, this search is unsuccessful due to a lack of education, which limits their opportunities to work in the trade and tourism sectors (interview with Tavip Agus Rayanto, 17 February 2016).

Crime and Corruption in Yogyakarta

They were having established that Yogyakarta’s Human Development Index and its overall socio-economic track record under Hamengkubuwono X have been reasonably strong. This last section of this paper will discuss other indicators of social stability, such as crime rates and corruption. In the absence of available public opinion surveys about the sultan’s
performance in office, it hoped that analyzing crime and corruption data would further help to establish. Whether there were grounds for public dissatisfaction with the sultan’s performance as governor could be exploited by opponents of his special privileges during the deliberations about a new specialness law.

Crime Rates

Based on 2015 provincial police reports in Indonesia, there were 9,692 criminal cases in Yogyakarta that were being investigated by police. This figure was lower than the national average of 11,029 cases, but given Yogyakarta’s small population, this is a sizeable number of criminal cases. Even more concerning are two other statistics. First, the number of criminal acts in Yogyakarta has risen in most years, with a few exceptions, reaching unprecedented heights in 2015. Second, only a small amount of cases resolved by the police. While the national average of resolved cases stood at 58.13 percent in 2015, in Yogyakarta, only 48.64 percent of the documented cases resolved.

Criminal cases in Yogyakarta dominated by conventional crimes. Such as theft, include transnational crimes and crimes against state property. However, their numbers are small, comprising only 7.5 percent of all cases in Yogyakarta, while the rest are conventional crimes. Some criminal acts have decreased over the years, but evidence of deceit has risen sharply first between 2006 and 2010 and then again after 2014 (see Figure 3).

Another type of criminality that has gained widespread public attention in Yogyakarta since the 1970s is gang violence, including brawls between youth and student gangs. Even though the number of preman (young males in a group engaged in criminal activities, gangsters). Appears to have decreased since the so-called Petrus (an abbreviation of pembunuhan misterius, which means mysterious murder) killings. In 1983, which started in Yogyakarta and killed thousands of preman (Kristiansen, 2003, p. 114), there are still many notorious gangs in Yogyakarta. Groups control vast tracts of territory to run their illicit security businesses, and some have good connections to prominent local figures and political parties (Azca, 2013, p. 89). The number of violent crime cases involving gangs in Yogyakarta is lower than a conventional crime; however, when it does occur, these cases usually attract widespread public attention.

For example, in 2013, a member of the army’s Special Forces commando (Kopassus) was killed during an altercation with preman in Hugo’s Café in Yogyakarta. Following the incident, twelve members of Kopassus broke into the Cebongan prison, where the suspects were being detained and shot four of them dead. Those suspects were all members of a well-known gang that controlled the eastern part of Yogyakarta city, including the location of the café. Though the Kopassus members later

Figure 3. Five Highest Conventional Crimes in Yogyakarta

Source: BPS Yogyakarta
surrendered, they received only very light sentences (Wijaya, 2013). Surprisingly, some communities expressed their gratitude to Kopassus as they felt that gang violence was a problem that does indeed need to eradicate with brute force. The case and the subsequent public reactions illustrated that gang violence is indeed an issue of great public concern.

Yogyakarta has also experienced brawls between student gangs, especially in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. Even though such fights are rare, they do still occur occasionally, casting a dark shadow on Yogyakarta’s reputation as an education hub. Based on regional police reports from 2013, there were still 79 school gangs in Yogyakarta (Efianingrum, 2016, p. 537). Student gangs evolve from youth gangs to school-based gangs, and their members are not only active students but also alumni who still have contact with their school gangs. Clashes in the form of brawls, ambushes, and motorbike attacks occur sporadically but rarely make it into the police statistics. The police only document student gang violence cases if they result in casualties reported to the police. Sultan Hamengkubuwono has repeatedly urged politicians and educational institutions to do more to get young people away from criminal networks. In response, several schools in Yogyakarta have initiated new programs to prevent gang violence in schools, for example, new school regulations and extracurricular activities (Azca, 2013, pp. 135-152).

If the governor is concerned about the ongoing youth violence, so are community groups and NGOs. Apart from gang violence, it is mainly the rise of religiously and ethnically motivated intolerance and violence that has alarmed human rights groups. According to the Setara Institute, 53 cases of violations of religious freedom were documented between 2007 and 2016, making Yogyakarta a ‘red area’ for religious intolerance (Muryanto, 2017). The increasing number of attacks on minorities prompted the Anti-violence Community of Yogyakarta (Makaryo) to declare a state of emergency in Yogyakarta (Sodik, 2013). Other groups like the well-known Legal Aid Institute of Yogyakarta (LBH) have accused the government of inaction and urged the sultan to work harder in providing public safety for the people of Yogyakarta (Maharani, 2016).

Corruption

Arguably the most prominent crime that affects political legitimacy in Indonesia is corruption. Since the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission in 2004, countless politicians, bureaucrats, and business people have been arrested and convicted with lengthy jail sentences (Butt, 2011; Schütte, 2012). But the constant stream of new cases indicates that prosecution has only a limited deterrent effect on Indonesia’s corruption. The country’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) produced annually by Transparency International (TI) has improved slightly over the years but remains low by international standards. Significantly, TI’s Indonesian branch also publishes CPIs for selected cities in Indonesia. Between 2004 and 2010, Yogyakarta included these reports, showing that the city with a special status did reasonably well on the CPI (see Figure 4).

The number of cases reported to the KPK in Yogyakarta has fluctuated over the years but has usually stayed under 100 reports per year. The only exception was in 2014 when 138 public complaints registered by the KPK (see Table 7.3). Compared to other provinces, especially those ranked highly in the HDI index, these
are relatively low figures. Still, given Yogyakarta’s small population, it is clear that Yogyakarta is not immune to corruption. In fact, since 2004, there have been several corruption cases that ended in convictions by the KPK. Among those sentenced to jail terms have been district heads, parliament members, bureaucrats, and local business people such as Ibnu Subiyanto, the head of Sleman’s District. The corruption court sentenced Ibnu Subiyanto to 3 years in jail after he proved to be guilty in a corruption case of mark up the budget of school textbook procurement in Sleman District. In another case was 14 members of parliament of Gunung Kidul District who was guilty of corruption cases of misuse of the DPRD allowance fund. The court sentenced them to one year and four months in jail.

What important is to note, however, is that the royal family has, so far, never implicated in such cases. For the public legitimacy of the sultan, this track record is crucial as it underlines his status as a different kind of leader. However, corruption allegations have at times been leveled against close allies of the sultan, for example, the former district head of Bantul. In 2011, Idham Samawi alleged to have embezzled budget funds allocated to a local football club. The investigation dragged on for a long time but eventually terminated after Samawi repaid the grant to avoid prosecution. In its annual report, the KPK cited insufficient evidence about closing the case before bringing it to court. CSOs heavily criticized the handling of the case like PUKAT Korupsi (Pusat Kajian Anti Korupsi/The Centre of Anti-corruption Study) UGM and ICM (Indonesian Court Monitoring) Yogyakarta. They argued that the case was closed due to political intervention from the highest levels because the suspect was well-connected to government officials in Jakarta as well as the Sultan of Yogyakarta. No such intervention could be proven, of course, and the sultan came out of the scandal without severe damage to his reputation.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper aimed to account for the performance of Yogyakarta under the leadership of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. In his capacity as governor, Hamengkubuwono has a coordinating role to play between the provincial, municipal, and district governments in Yogyakarta. Though most policy responsibility lies with the districts and city of Yogyakarta, the sultan still has an important function to fulfill as effective cooperation between different tiers of government is a crucial factor in facilitating successful policy outcomes at the local level. For the sultan, his role as mediator and coordinator works well because it reinforces public perceptions of him as a neutral arbiter who stays aloof from the bickering of day-to-day politics. Over the years, he has cultivated this image of a paternalistic figure by making regular appeals to district heads and Yogyakarta mayor to serve the people better. In the rare events where conflicts arise over public policy (for example, overland), Hamengkubuwono successfully deflected the blame for controversial
policies to the lower-level governments, even though the royal palace often has a direct stake in these policy decisions.

For the sultan, stable socio-economic development has added another layer of legitimacy to his deeply rooted cultural legitimacy and role in providing political stability. As the paper has shown, by and large, the special region of Yogyakarta has performed reasonably well on the most critical socioeconomic development indicators. Outcomes in some policy areas remain underwhelming, for example, in poverty alleviation and inequality. Still, public attention to these issues has limited as the most heavily affected regions are the rural areas on the outskirts of the province.

One may argue that Yogyakarta’s decent socio-economic development is an indication that the province’s unique governmental arrangement with an unelected governor has worked well. Indeed, supporters of the sultan’s privileges as an unelected governor can claim that the appointment mechanism has freed the provincial governor from political commitments to reward donors and supporters through illicit transactional politics, which are all too familiar in other provinces in Indonesia where governors are freely elected. Bureaucrats also believed to have a higher dedication to serving their governor because of their deeply rooted respect for the sultan as a cultural leader. In short, Yogyakarta’s special status has facilitated rather than obstructed good governance, even though the provincial leader not elected by democratic means.

Given the good governmental performance, the political stability, and profoundly rooted legitimacy bestowed upon the governor due to his royal heritage, it would seem that there was no reason to alter Yogyakarta’s governmental structure. However, the legal framework for regional autonomy that became effective in 2004 necessitated amendments or revisions to the legal foundations of Yogyakarta’s special status. Many people in Yogyakarta may have hoped that these amendments were only a formality that would reiterate their province’s special status. Still, it soon became clear that the central government had other ideas. When negotiations about the future of Yogyakarta began in earnest during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the sultan and his followers found themselves confronted with a political adversary who seemed to be intent on abolishing Indonesia’s last sub-national monarchy.

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