

Police transformation within constitutional democracy design: Evidence from Indonesia

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Abstract

Indonesian National Police (Polri) institutional position following the 1998 political transition remains a contested terrain, particularly in reconciling operational independence with the demands of democratic governance. This study investigates how Polri has navigated that tension, drawing on a mixed-methods design that integrates diagnostic mapping of 130 institutional problems, structured surveys with 167 experts distributed across 50 districts and cities, and a comparative analysis of policing frameworks in France and the Netherlands. The findings expose a fundamental contradiction within Act No. 2/2002. While the legislation formally separates Polri from military structures, it simultaneously creates an accountability vacuum, a concern reflected in the 61.7% of expert assessments that are unfavourable. Field data further document three entrenched dysfunctions: a militaristic organisational culture, integrity failures concentrated in investigative units, and chronic service deficiencies flagged repeatedly in ombudsman evaluations between 2020 and 2023. Building on these findings, the study advances a transformation framework organised around four mutually reinforcing pillars: humanist policing grounded in rights protection, anti-corruption governance through merit-based systems, technology-enabled service modernisation, and community-centred precision policing. Proposed reforms target legislative revision, restructuring of professional education, and the development of civilian oversight mechanisms with genuine supervisory authority. The study offers a replicable analytical model for evaluating police reform trajectories in post-authoritarian democratic settings.

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Introduction

The post-1998 democratic transition in Indonesia brought fundamental changes to state-citizen relations, including in security-sector governance. The separation of the Republic of Indonesian National Police (Polri) from the Indonesian National Army (TNI) represented the



emergence of a civilian police institution within a democratic legal framework. This separation was normatively confirmed through MPR Decree No. VI/MPR/2000 and institutionalised through Act No. 2/2002 concerning the Republic of Indonesia National Police. However, two decades post-reform, a fundamental question emerges: to what extent has Polri's institutional transformation aligned with constitutional democracy's goals of upholding the rule of law, accountability, and respect for fundamental human rights?

Empirical conditions reveal dissonance between normative frameworks and institutional practices. Polri continues to face various structural issues, including low public accountability, repressive tactics in managing demonstrations, and corruption within operational units. Indonesian Ombudsman data consistently ranks Polri among the top three institutions receiving public complaints from 2020 to 2023. Surveys of 167 experts across 50 districts/cities revealed that over 61% of respondents evaluated Polri's public service performance as inadequate, indicating that police reform problems extend beyond technical bureaucracy to encompass institutional design insufficiently aligned with democratic and accountable principles.

The mismatch between operational reality and democratic ideals manifests in various social conflict cases, such as in Wadas, Purworejo Regency, Central Java, and Rempang, Batam City, Riau Islands, where police authorities employed authoritarian rather than service-oriented approaches. Repressive actions in situations that require dialogue-based solutions indicate that reform has not successfully addressed ethical issues and institutional culture. Democratic policing requires law enforcement to function as citizen protectors and guardians rather than state repressive instruments (Bayley, 2005). This gap demonstrates weaknesses in integrating constitutional principles into police institutional practices.

To address these complex challenges, the Good Security Sector Governance (GSSG) approach, developed by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, offers a conceptual framework for sustainable reform (DCAF, 2015). GSSG emphasises the necessity for security sectors, including the police, to adhere to the rule of law, transparency, accountability, societal participation, and respect for fundamental human rights. Beyond structural reform, GSSG encourages values transformation and democracy-based governance, where security authorities remain accountable not only to political authorities but also to the sovereignty-holding public.

One crucial problem in Polri's institutional design is the lack of effective, independent external oversight mechanisms. The National Police Commission (Kompolnas), although normatively established as a supervisory institution, functions primarily as a consultative body without investigative authority or sanctioning power. This creates paradoxes within the checks-and-balances system that should constitute the pillars of constitutional democracy. By comparison, countries like France and the Netherlands have developed robust oversight models through institutions such as the Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale (IGPN) and Rijksrecherche, which possess operational independence and the capacity to act against police misconduct (DCAF, 2020).

Legal design revision becomes urgent within police reform contexts. Act No. 2/2002 requires alignment with the constitutional principles set out in Articles 28 and 30 of the 1945 Constitution, particularly regarding security rights, the assurance of justice, and public participation in national security governance. Long-term development projections outlined in Indonesia Vision 2045 position democratic governance and integrity-based government as primary pillars of national resilience. Thus, Polri reform represents not merely a sectoral need but an integral component of national transformation toward substantive democracy.

Therefore, this research aims to develop an evaluative framework for constitutional police design, positioning GSSG as the primary paradigm for institutional advancement. This study combines multidisciplinary approaches with mixed methods, incorporating normative

legal framework analysis, expert surveys, and comparative international practice studies. Researchers anticipate that the findings will contribute to the democratic policing literature and provide policy recommendations that support a more democratic, professional, and humanistic transformation of Polri.

Literature Review

Constitutional Framework and Institutional Design

Institutional design within constitutional frameworks constitutes the determining foundation for how state authority is exercised and controlled (Ginsburg & Huq, 2020). Constitutional design must explicitly establish institutions that prevent the concentration of authority while ensuring accountability through systems of checks and balances. In the Indonesian context, Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution mandates Polri's existence but lacks detailed oversight mechanisms and fundamental human rights guarantees. This creates legislative derivative space, such as Act No. 2/2002, for the formulation of institutional designs that deviate from constitutional democratic principles.

Act No. 2/2002 seeks to place the police under executive control, without providing robust external oversight bodies. This model creates vertical authority imbalances and opens potential for police authority abuse. The weakness of Kompolnas' authority to address Polri member violations reflects legal design deficits with implications for institutional accountability. Imbalances between Polri's operational autonomy and independent oversight mechanisms constitute urgent structural problems that require reconstruction.

Comparative studies demonstrate that democratic policing demands institutional structures that are normatively and practically capable of ensuring public control of police institutions (Bayley, 2005). This includes legislative oversight, judicial institutions, and civil society involvement. When legal design fails to provide these elements, police potentially develop into institutions unresponsive to democratic principles, as evidenced in Indonesian demonstration handling and discriminatory law enforcement cases.

Constitutional design hybrid oversight mechanisms processes involve complex interactions between various forces and mechanisms that shape institutional outcomes (Elster, 1995). The constitution-making process requires careful consideration of power distribution mechanisms to prevent institutional capture while ensuring effective governance. In transitional democracies, the challenge lies in balancing institutional autonomy with democratic accountability, particularly in security sector institutions where the stakes for democratic consolidation are particularly high.

The constitutional court's role in safeguarding constitutional rights extends beyond judicial review of legislation to encompass broader mechanisms of constitutional protection. Research on Indonesia's Constitutional Court demonstrates that institutional effectiveness in delivering constitutional justice depends not only on formal authority but also on enforcement mechanisms for court decisions (Hasani et al., 2022). The study reveals persistent challenges in compliance with Constitutional Court decisions, with statistical data showing that 22.01% of decisions between 2013 and 2019 were not implemented, indicating gaps between constitutional adjudication and practical enforcement that undermine the rule of law.

This implementation deficit highlights the importance of constitutional complaint mechanisms as complementary instruments for protecting citizens' rights. Constitutional complaints represent urgent needs in constitutional justice systems, allowing citizens to seek redress when state actions beyond legislative provisions violate their constitutional rights (Adnyani et al., 2024). The mechanism serves as a final recourse for citizens when all legal remedies have been exhausted, positioning the Constitutional Court as the ultimate guardian of constitutional rights against violations by government officials or policies.

The connection between constitutional court effectiveness and police accountability becomes particularly salient when considering that constitutional violations may stem not only

from unconstitutional laws but also from implementation practices by state organs. Constitutional complaint mechanisms can address situations where laws themselves are constitutional but their application by authorities, including police, violates fundamental rights, a gap that traditional judicial review cannot adequately address.

Good Security Sector Governance Framework

The GSSG platform serves as an analytical tool for examining Polri transformation in Indonesia. GSSG represents a normative approach developed by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance to ensure security sectors follow democratic principles, the rule of law, and public accountability (DCAF, 2015). This concept encompasses not only military and intelligence but also police as civilian institutions oriented toward citizen service and protection. Within the GSSG framework, police should be transparent, professional, and open to external oversight by both state institutions and the public.

One key GSSG element is integrating human rights-based approaches in all security institution activities. Integrated human rights training within police educational systems can reduce excessive force tendencies while increasing public trust. Therefore, Polri must develop a systematic curriculum and sustainable human rights training as part of institutional transformation strategies.

Another GSSG element involves hybrid oversight mechanisms, including internal, external, and social monitoring. The importance of hybrid oversight models involving independent institutions such as Ombudsmen, parliaments, and public organisations lies in their capacity to create deliberative and responsive spaces for addressing police authority violations (Abdi & Hashi, 2024). In the Indonesian context, strengthening Kompolnas roles while developing public-based participatory mechanisms represents strategic steps for reinforcing these principles.

Security sector reform initiatives require comprehensive policy transfer mechanisms that consider local contexts and institutional capacity (Schroeder et al., 2013). The Palestinian Territories, Liberia, and Timor-Leste cases demonstrate that successful security sector transformation depends on understanding local power dynamics and institutional legacies. Similarly, building institutional capacity for transnational security governance requires sustained knowledge production and institutional learning processes (Finkenbusch, 2018).

Transparency in security institution management constitutes a vital GSSG aspect. Information technology implementation, such as e-policing systems, can expand public access to police services while opening channels for public oversight. Digital technology utilisation can increase efficiency, strengthen accountability, and reduce distances between police and society. Therefore, Polri's transformation toward digital police models represents an integral component of comprehensive GSSG implementation.

External Oversight Mechanisms

External oversight constitutes a crucial element in constitutional democratic systems for ensuring accountability and preventing power abuse. Democratic oversight of the security apparatus must occur through three pathways: legislative, judicial, and civil society (Hills, 2007). Many countries have established independent oversight institutions as normative standards. For example, the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) in the UK possesses investigative authority unavailable to similar Indonesian institutions, demonstrating that the absence of strong oversight institutions constitutes an obstacle to police institutional democratisation.

Oversight models applied in France and the Netherlands can serve as references for formulating Indonesian oversight frameworks. In France, the Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale (IGPN) has the mandate to investigate violations by police members independently. In the Netherlands, Rijksrecherche functions as an investigative institution outside direct police

control. Both models confirm the importance of structural separation between oversight and supervised institutions to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of the oversight process (DCAF, 2020).

The European context provides additional insights into police accountability regimes. The emergence of European policing governance has necessitated new accountability frameworks that transcend national boundaries while maintaining democratic oversight principles (den Boer, 2002). These transnational accountability mechanisms offer valuable lessons for developing robust oversight systems in national contexts.

Beyond institutional structure, public oversight plays an important role in overseeing police reform. Civilian Review Boards (CRBs) in several major United States cities have increased public trust in the apparatus through transparent, participatory complaint-resolution processes (Walker, 2001). In Indonesia, such mechanisms remain unsystematically institutionalised, despite public involvement being an important pillar in horizontal oversight and citizen empowerment.

Police Accountability and Public Trust

Recent studies emphasise the critical relationship between police accountability mechanisms and public cooperation. Research demonstrates that police accountability, effectiveness, and public trust are interconnected elements that significantly influence public cooperation with law enforcement (Abdi & Hashi, 2024). This relationship is particularly important in post-authoritarian contexts, where police legitimacy must be rebuilt through demonstrable accountability measures.

Police oversight mechanisms in democratic societies serve multiple functions beyond mere complaint resolution. Comparative analyses of police oversight systems reveal that effective oversight bodies contribute to institutional learning, policy development, and culture change within police organisations (Mashaka et al., 2024). These findings suggest that oversight mechanisms should be designed not only as reactive complaint-handling systems but as proactive tools for continuous institutional improvement.

The procedural justice framework has emerged as a significant theoretical contribution to understanding police-community relations. Studies examining young people's perceptions of procedurally just policing demonstrate that fair treatment, opportunities for voice, neutrality, and trustworthy motives significantly influence public acceptance of police authority (Bates et al., 2021). This research emphasises the importance of integrating procedural justice principles into police training and operational procedures.

Recent legislative reforms in various countries have strengthened human rights protections within police frameworks. Nigeria's Police Act 2020 demonstrates how legal reforms can enhance human rights safeguards while maintaining operational effectiveness (Ehirim et al., 2024). The Act establishes clear protocols for police conduct and provides mechanisms to address violations, underscoring the importance of comprehensive legal frameworks in police reform initiatives.

Contemporary Challenges in Police Reform

Recent scholarship highlights persistent challenges in police reform efforts globally. Studies examining police use of force reveal that organisational culture, training methodologies, and oversight mechanisms significantly influence officer behaviour and decision-making processes (Yim et al., 2025). These findings underscore the importance of comprehensive reform approaches that address cultural, structural, and procedural dimensions simultaneously.

Recent research demonstrates that police institutional orientations, whether as guardians or warriors, significantly influence use-of-force attitudes and operational decisions, indicating

that cultural transformation is a fundamental component of successful police reform (McCarthy et al., 2024).

Contemporary policing faces additional challenges related to technological advancement and changing social expectations. Studies examining safety and security perceptions in modern urban environments reveal that police effectiveness is increasingly measured not only by crime reduction but also by community engagement, transparency, and responsiveness to diverse community needs (Sebire et al., 2025).

Method

This study employs an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach as developed by Creswell & Creswell (2017), consisting of three mutually supportive research stages. The first stage involves analysing constitutional documents to examine the legal frameworks governing Polri within the context of constitutional democracy. Documents analysed include the 1945 Constitution, particularly Articles 30 (regulating the police) and 28 (regulating fundamental human rights), as well as Act No. 2/2002 on the police and the draft 2045 Polri Grand Strategy. Additionally, this research examines Constitutional Court decisions, including Decision No. 012/PUU-I/2003, regarding testing of Police Act provisions. Document analysis employed content analysis methods (Bowen, 2009) with thematic coding based on democratic policing principles, alongside gap analysis evaluating discrepancies between constitutional mandates and applicable derivative policies.

The second stage involves expert surveys designed as validity tests for empirical findings from normative analysis. Surveys were distributed to 167 purposively selected respondents who met specific criteria: individuals with academic backgrounds, legal practitioners, or NGO activists focused on fundamental human rights. Respondents were distributed across 50 districts/cities to obtain representative data from various local contexts. Survey instruments were developed by adapting the Democratic Policing Index to assess Polri's institutional constitutionality and accountability. The data were analysed using descriptive statistics and correlational analysis to test correlations between constitutional compliance levels and perceptions of Polri institutional performance. Instrument reliability testing showed Cronbach's Alpha values of 0.89, indicating high internal consistency.

The third stage involves comparative case studies focusing on two aspects. First, this research examined demonstration handling in Wadas, Purworejo, Central Java, and Rempang, Batam City, Riau Islands, to evaluate the extent to which Polri actions reflect fundamental human rights principles guaranteed in Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution. Second, it compares French and Dutch police models, focusing on oversight structures, legal mandates, and sanction mechanisms for police authority violations. Comparative analysis employs comparative legal analysis approaches and is presented in a matrix comparison format to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each model.

The research also examines collaborative governance mechanisms in regional contexts, drawing on maritime security cooperation models that demonstrate effective institutional coordination across jurisdictional boundaries (Wang et al., 2025). Additionally, the study considers institutional democratisation processes in post-conflict societies, examining how public participation mechanisms contribute to the reconstruction of police legitimacy (Seleti, 2000).

Findings from the three stages are integrated using joint display analysis methods, combining analysis results at three levels: macro (constitution), meso (institutional policy), and micro (field practice). This approach aims to identify and connect gaps between legal design and democratic policing practice while providing empirical bases for formulating Polri institutional reform roadmaps.

Results and Discussion

Constitutional Democracy Design for Indonesian Police Post-Reform

Constitutional design in post-reform Polri reflects a fundamental transformation from authoritarian security paradigms toward democratic policing models. Article 30, paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution, as an amendment product, explicitly establishes Polri's position as "state apparatus maintaining public security and order by protecting, sheltering, serving the public, and upholding law." This constitutional formulation marks significant shifts from police conceptions as a state repressive apparatus to public service institutions with comprehensive multidimensional mandates.

Structural separation of Polri and TNI through MPR Decrees No. VI/MPR/2000 and VII/MPR/2000 represent strategic steps toward demilitarising domestic security functions. These constitutional decisions were reinforced through Act No. 2/2002 concerning the Republic of Indonesia National Police, which positions Polri directly under the President and separates it from military hierarchical structures. This institutional repositioning aims to strengthen the police's civilian character and redirect their orientation from regime security (regime-centred security) toward public security (public-centred security).

However, a critical analysis of constitutional arrangements and their derivatives reveals a paradoxical design of police institutions. While police enjoy broad institutional autonomy in law enforcement and security maintenance functions, the democratic oversight mechanisms needed to balance this autonomy are inadequately developed. Article 8 of Act No. 2/2002 positions the police under the President without detailing proportional checks and balances, creating vertical, monolithic command structures.

Comparative analyses demonstrate significant differences with constitutional models in consolidated democratic countries. In Germany, federal structures require a distribution of authority between the federal police (Bundespolizei) and the state police (Landespolizei), with layered oversight mechanisms involving parliaments at both government levels. Similarly, post-apartheid South Africa established the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) with structural and functional autonomy to investigate police member violations, with direct parliamentary oversight.

The question of police organisational structure remains central to democratic policing debates. Research examining decentralised versus centralised police organisations suggests that decentralised models may be more responsive to local community needs while maintaining democratic accountability (Han et al., 2022). The South Korean case demonstrates that organisational structure significantly influences police responsiveness and public trust in democratic contexts.

Unlike these models, the National Police Commission (Kompolnas), established under Act No. 2/2002, tends to possess consultative rather than investigative characteristics. Article 38, paragraph (1), of the Act limits Kompolnas' functions to providing "considerations to the President in appointing and dismissing Police Chiefs, as well as other suggestions and considerations to the President for Polri to become more professional and independent." These authority limitations significantly impact Kompolnas' effectiveness as oversight instruments in Polri's constitutional structures.

From a *Good Security Sector Governance* (GSSG) perspective, this gap reflects a fundamental dilemma in Polri's institutional design. GSSG emphasises a balance between operational effectiveness and democratic accountability. However, imbalances between institutional autonomy and democratic oversight within Polri hinder the comprehensive implementation of GSSG principles.

Constitutional gaps also contradict the principles of constitutional democracy, emphasising the restriction of power through mechanisms of checks and balances.

Constitutional democratic design functions not only as a power distribution among various state institutions but also as a power to limit power and prevent abuse. In Polri contexts, the absence of effective restriction mechanisms creates potential for authority abuse and democratic value erosion in policing practices.

Fundamental Problems in Police Performance within Democratic Governance

Two decades post-reform, various fundamental problems persist in Polri's institutional performance. This research identifies at least three main problems: residues of a militaristic culture, weak accountability for fundamental human rights violations, and involvement in corruption practices. All three problems are rooted in institutional designs that are unsupportive of democratic policing principles and misaligned with constitutional visions.

First, authoritarian cultures with hierarchical and repressive characteristics persist in Indonesian police approaches. This manifests in demonstration-handling actions in which security approaches dominate over fundamental human rights approaches. Case studies of the Wadas and Rempang incidents demonstrate disproportionate use of power and insufficient dialogue between officers and citizens. Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution guarantees the right to publicly express opinions peacefully, which should serve as a primary reference in police operational policies.

Second, accountability problems remain the primary challenge. Although Komnas HAM (National Commission on Human Rights) and the Ombudsman accept public complaints of police violations, their handling often lacks transparency. Surveys of 167 experts show that 72% of respondents evaluate Kompolnas' performance as ineffective in operating oversight functions. Kompolnas's lack of authority to conduct investigations and impose sanctions renders external oversight weak and merely symbolic.

Third, corruption practices in police institutions, especially in criminal units, demonstrate systemic integrity weaknesses. Research reveals 37 cases of structural corruption involving police members, reflecting problems in recruitment, promotions, and internal disciplinary enforcement. When selection mechanisms and career advancement are influenced more by loyalty than competence, professionalism cultures become difficult to sustain.

The interplay between this entrenched authoritarian culture and the systemic lack of accountability creates a dangerous cycle of impunity within the institution. Because external oversight mechanisms like Kompolnas lack the teeth to enforce disciplinary actions, field officers and their commanders rarely face significant consequences for using excessive force in agrarian conflicts or public demonstrations. Consequently, reliance on repressive tactics becomes normalised as standard operating procedure rather than treated as a serious violation. This unchecked impunity not only alienates the communities the police are sworn to protect but also systematically undermines the democratic principles and human rights standards that should dictate their conduct.

Structural corruption within internal recruitment and career advancement directly reinforces these operational and accountability failures. When promotions and strategic positions are dictated by patronage and transactional loyalty rather than professional competence, the institution inherently selects for leaders who prioritise protecting their networks over enforcing ethical standards. This transactional culture inevitably trickles down to the rank and file, where the abuse of power is implicitly tolerated. Ultimately, as long as this systemic corruption remains deeply woven into the institutional fabric, any attempts to shift the police force towards a transparent, human rights-based democratic policing model will be continuously derailed from within.

Analysis of Polri's constitutional mandates under Article 30, paragraph (4), of the 1945 Constitution reveals that the Good Security Sector Governance (GSSG) framework represents an ideal design aligned with Indonesian police reform visions. Mandates to "protect, shelter,

serve society, and uphold law" inherently entail accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and rule-of-law principles that constitute GSSG foundations—separation of Polri and TNI through MPR Decrees No. VI/MPR/2000 and VII/MPR/2000 also reflect constitutional efforts to strengthen the civilian character of the police in accordance with GSSG democracy principles.

However, identified implementation gaps indicate that structural transformation has not fully led to operational and cultural changes. GSSG principles, such as democratic accountability, transparency, and public participation, implicit in constitutional mandates, have not been optimally manifested in Polri institutional practices. Therefore, GSSG, developed by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, can serve as a strategic framework for overcoming gaps and aligning police practices with constitutional mandates.

Based on a correlation analysis of constitutional mandates and GSSG principles, this research proposes Polri Constitutional Transformation models comprising four strategic dimensions: legal reform, institutional transformation, public participation, and technology integration.

Legal Framework Reconstruction

Regulatory reform through the revision of Act No. 2/2002 constitutes a fundamental step in strengthening Polri's constitutional foundations. This revision needs to encompass several crucial aspects. *First*, a redefinition of Polri's relations with other state institutions to strengthen the mechanisms of checks and balances. Rather than placing Polri directly under the President without intermediation, alternative models, such as supervision by relevant ministries with substantive parliamentary oversight, should be considered.

Second, reformulate police authority discretion with clear boundaries to prevent abuse. The proportionality and necessity principles require explicit articulation as parameters of police authority, especially in contexts of power use and the limitation of individual freedom. The importance of codifying these principles within legal frameworks ensures that police discretion operates in accordance with constitutional fundamental human rights standards.

Third, strengthening pre-trial procedures for invasive police actions such as arrests, searches, and confiscations. This reform will strengthen constitutional protection of citizens' rights, as guaranteed in Article 28G of the 1945 Constitution, while creating preventive mechanisms to address potential police abuse of authority. Comparative studies of pre-trial procedures emphasise the importance of judicial oversight over police discretion to ensure procedural legitimacy in law enforcement processes.

Fourth, strengthening mechanisms to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Comprehensive studies of criminal law procedural reform in new democratic countries highlight the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a mechanism for preventing procedural violations by law enforcement authorities (Jackson & Bradford, 2021). This doctrine ensures that Polri's law enforcement processes are not only constitutionally mandated but also uphold procedural justice principles that constitute important GSSG elements.

Understanding police procedural justice requires expanded analytical frameworks that consider both internal organisational factors and external environmental influences (Wang et al., 2025). Research demonstrates that procedural justice perceptions are shaped by complex interactions between officer behaviour, institutional policies, and community expectations, suggesting that legal reforms must address multiple dimensions simultaneously

Supervisory Body Institutionalisation

Kompolnas transformation from consultative institutions to independent supervisory bodies with substantive authority represents strategic steps in strengthening Polri's external accountability in accordance with constitutional mandates. This institutional reform includes: first, strengthening Kompolnas' structural independence through mechanisms for member appointment and dismissal, involving the parliament and civil society in selection processes to

minimise executive intervention. The importance of structural and functional independence ensures oversight effectiveness.

Second, expanding investigative authority over alleged violations committed by police members. This authority encompasses access to internal documents, witness summoning authority, and independent investigation capabilities for serious violation cases such as excessive force use, corruption, and torture. Research findings indicate that institutions with strong investigative authority tend to be more effective at promoting police accountability, a fundamental GSSG principle implicitly embedded in Polri's constitutional mandates.

Third, granting authority to impose administrative sanctions on police officers who violate regulations would enhance oversight effectiveness by ensuring clear consequences and deterring future violations.

Fourth, strengthening internal audit capacity and integrity. Studies of police management reform highlight the importance of internal audits as tools to increase transparency and accountability in police operations (Sheptycki, 2002). This mechanism allows systematic evaluation of police practices at various levels, identifies problematic areas, and recommends reconstructive steps aligned with Polri's constitutional mandates as public protectors and guardians.

The success of supervisory body institutionalisation depends significantly on understanding and addressing power dynamics within police institutions. Research demonstrates that institutional transformation requires careful analysis of conflict mechanisms and actor interactions that may resist oversight mechanisms (Kumeh & Hirons, 2025). Successful institutional change depends on recognising and addressing underlying power structures that may undermine supervisory effectiveness. In police reform contexts, this requires attention to both formal institutional arrangements and informal power networks that influence implementation outcomes. Therefore, Kompolnas strengthening must consider not only expanding legal authority but also strategies to overcome institutional resistance and build coalitions supportive of democratic oversight.

Police training reform constitutes a critical component of institutional transformation. Evidence-informed training approaches that apply ecological models demonstrate greater effectiveness in producing behavioural change among officers (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2023). Training programs must address not only technical skills but also procedural justice principles and community engagement strategies to ensure comprehensive reform outcomes.

To achieve these comprehensive reform outcomes, police academies and ongoing professional development programs must decisively pivot away from historically militaristic and purely tactical paradigms. By institutionalising procedural justice, which emphasises fairness, transparency, impartiality, and the provision of citizens with a voice during encounters, the core curriculum enables officers to internalise democratic policing values at a foundational level. This ecological approach to training not only addresses individual officer behaviour in the field but also begins to dismantle the informal networks of resistance from the bottom up. When personnel are fundamentally educated to view human rights and ethical community engagement as core competencies, internal hostility towards external oversight bodies like Kompolnas naturally diminishes, fostering an environment where accountability is embraced as a hallmark of professional integrity rather than an institutional threat.

The synergy between a newly empowered, structurally independent Kompolnas and a comprehensively overhauled, evidence-based training regime is indispensable for the true realisation of GSSG. Strong external oversight provides the necessary systemic pressure, deterrents, and legal accountability, while progressive educational reform cultivates the internal ethical compass required for sustainable, long-term cultural change. Together, these dual forces, top-down structural accountability and bottom-up behavioural transformation, ensure that Polri does not merely comply with oversight mandates on paper, but genuinely and

consistently operationalises its constitutional duty to serve, protect, and uphold the democratic rights of the Indonesian public.

Public Participation Strengthening

Community policing institutionalisation and public participation in Polri oversight represent manifestations of GSSG participation principles, aligned with Polri's constitutional mandate to "serve society." This strategy includes, *first*, establishing Police and Community Partnership Forums (FKPM) at each administrative level, from the ward to the provincial level. Regular dialogue forums between police and communities contribute to increased public trust in police institutions and greater overall police effectiveness.

Second, integrating public perspectives in security policy planning and evaluation. Participatory planning processes increase the relevance and effectiveness of police policy while strengthening Polri's legitimacy in public eyes as a constitutionally mandated institution. Methods such as participatory planning and deliberative polling can facilitate substantive public involvement in these processes. The effectiveness of deliberative methods in improving public policy quality, including security policy contexts, has been demonstrated in research (Curato et al., 2019). Understanding demand in policing requires a comprehensive analysis of community needs and police capacity (Laufs et al., 2021). Effective demand management strategies must consider both community expectations and resource constraints, thereby creating sustainable models of police-community collaboration that enhance effectiveness and legitimacy.

Third, actively involving civil organisations in external oversight. The importance of oversight networks involving civil society institutions, academics, and independent media is that they expand the coverage and depth of oversight of the police institution. This involvement implements transparency and accountability principles within GSSG, as set out in Polri's constitutional mandates.

Fourth, strengthening public information transparency regarding Polri performance through regular statistical publication increases institutional accountability, creates databases for evidence-based evaluation, and enables public assessment of police fulfilment of their constitutional mandates as protectors and civil servants.

The mere formal establishment of these participatory mechanisms does not automatically guarantee genuine community empowerment. There is a persistent risk of tokenism, where forums like FKPM and public consultations become ceremonial spaces rather than arenas for substantive policy influence. If the ingrained hierarchical and state-centric policing culture remains unaddressed, officers may selectively engage only with community elites who validate their existing agendas, thereby marginalising vulnerable groups or critical voices. Therefore, translating the principles of GSSG into operational reality requires actively dismantling unequal power dynamics, ensuring that community input—especially from independent civil society oversight—meaningfully dictates security priorities rather than merely serving as an institutional public relations tool.

Synthesising these four strategies, grassroots partnerships, participatory planning, civil society oversight, and data transparency, creates a robust and sustainable ecosystem for democratic policing. This comprehensive framework forces a shift in the institutional mindset from reactive, force-based law enforcement to proactive, community-centred problem solving. By fully institutionalising this participatory feedback loop, Polri can systematically bridge the gap between complex community expectations and its own operational resource constraints. In doing so, the institution not only fulfils its foundational constitutional mandate to serve and protect society but also solidifies its democratic legitimacy as an accountable, modern law enforcement agency.

Technology Integration for Accountability

The utilisation of digital technology to increase Polri transparency and accountability constitutes an important component of institutional transformation aligned with GSSG principles and constitutional mandates in the digital age. This strategy includes, *first*, implementing bodycam systems for field-duty members, especially in high-risk situations such as demonstrations and criminal processing. This technology not only reduces excessive force abuse but also enhances officer accountability and public trust in police, aligning with constitutional protection and public service mandates.

Second, developing e-policing systems for transparent and efficient public administrative services. Digitalisation has positive impacts on transparency, accountability, and police service efficiency, as identified in research. Digitalisation of administrative processes, such as crime reporting, driver licence administration, and SKCK, will reduce potential abuse of discretion while increasing public access to police services, in accordance with Polri's constitutional mandate as civil servants.

Third, developing integrated responsive public reporting platforms. The digital platform's potential to strengthen public participation in oversight of security institutions has been highlighted in research. This platform allows public reporting of complaints or feedback on police performance, guaranteeing transparency in case handling and action processes, and strengthening accountability and responsiveness principles implicit in GSSG within constitutional mandates.

Fourth, data-driven performance monitoring. The importance of a data-based approach in government institution performance evaluation has been emphasised in research. By integrating various performance indicators into public-facing digital dashboards, this system enables more objective and comprehensive police performance evaluation, ensuring Polri effectively fulfils its constitutional mandates and complies with GSSG principles.

The four transformation dimensions above demonstrate how GSSG principles can serve as implementation frameworks for effectively and legitimately realising Polri's constitutional mandates. By aligning legal reform, institutional transformation, public participation, and technology integration with GSSG principles and constitutional mandates, Polri can become a democratic, professional, and public-oriented institution, as mandated by the Constitution.

However, the successful implementation of these digital technologies cannot be separated from the urgent need for internal cultural reform. Technological interventions like body cameras and e-policing systems are not panaceas; their effectiveness is fundamentally contingent on officers' willingness to genuinely embrace transparency. Without a simultaneous dismantling of entrenched patronage networks and the culture of impunity, there is a significant risk that these digital tools will be bypassed or manipulated—for instance, by intentionally disabling body cameras during critical field operations or strategically ignoring online public reports.

Expanding these four digital initiatives necessitates a serious commitment to overcoming infrastructure and capacity disparities across Indonesia's vast archipelago. The transition towards integrated e-policing and data-driven dashboards relies heavily on robust and equitable internet access, which remains a severe challenge in remote and underdeveloped regions. Additionally, Polri must heavily invest in human resource development to ensure that its personnel are not merely passive operators of technology, but digitally literate professionals capable of processing data ethically and managing public reporting platforms with a high degree of technical responsiveness.

The push for digital transformation must be stringently balanced with the protection of civil liberties and data privacy, which are equally vital constitutional mandates. As Polri collects increasingly vast amounts of citizen data through integrated responsive platforms and

administrative digitisation, the potential risks of digital surveillance and data misuse inevitably grow. Therefore, truly aligning with GSSG requires the establishment of strict, independent oversight mechanisms and comprehensive data protection protocols to ensure that these digital tools are utilised exclusively to enhance public service and accountability, rather than evolving into modern instruments of state overreach.

Conclusion

This study identifies fundamental gaps between constitutional design and the practical implementation of post-1998 Polri reform. Comprehensive analysis reveals institutional paradoxes in Act No. 2/2002, which provides autonomy without adequate democratic oversight, creating conditions allowing persistence of three main structural dysfunctions: militaristic culture manifested in demonstration handling (66 cases), systemic corruption practices, especially in Criminal Investigation Units (37 recorded cases), and public service failures (3rd ranking based on Ombudsman reports 2020-2023).

Based on a constitutional analysis of Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution, mandates, and comparative studies of French-Dutch policing models, this research finds that the Good Security Sector Governance (GSSG) framework represents ideal approaches aligned with reform visions and constitutional democracy principles. This study offers comprehensive transformation models with four mutually integrated strategic dimensions: legal framework reconstruction through Act No. 2/2002 amendments to strengthen checks and balances mechanisms with Polri structural repositioning in state governance; institutional transformation by strengthening *Kompolnas* to become independent oversight institutions with substantive investigative authority adopting French IGPN models; public participation strengthening through community policing institutionalization and public involvement mechanisms in oversight and security policy planning; and technology integration through bodycam system implementation, e-policing, and digital reporting platforms to strengthen transparency and accountability.

This transformation constitutes fundamental prerequisites for aligning police practices with constitutional mandates and for strengthening the foundations of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, according to Indonesia Vision 2045, particularly in the National Resilience and Governance pillars. Future research should focus on implementation mechanisms for these transformation models, including detailed policy frameworks, budget allocations, and timeline specifications for sustainable reform processes.

The findings of this study contribute to the growing body of literature on police reform in post-authoritarian contexts, demonstrating that successful democratic policing transformation requires comprehensive approaches addressing legal, institutional, cultural, and technological dimensions simultaneously. The Indonesian case provides valuable insights for other transitional democracies facing similar challenges in security sector reform, particularly in balancing institutional autonomy with democratic accountability mechanisms.

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Disclosure Statement

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Ethics Approval

This is an observational study. The Research Ethics Committee has confirmed that no ethical approval is required.

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